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On Appeal from the United States District Court for the 
Western District of Pennsylvania 
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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
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CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
Darien Houser filed a pro se lawsuit against prison 
officials for deliberate indifference to his medical needs.  The 
District Court appointed him counsel.  When counsel 
withdrew, however, the District Court declined to appoint a 
new lawyer.  Houser tried the case himself and lost.  He now 
argues that the District Court abused its discretion by denying 
him new counsel without considering the six factors that this 
Court set forth to guide district courts in Tabron v. Grace, 6 
F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 1993).  We hold that Tabron applies to 
successive motions to appoint counsel, but that denying Houser 
new counsel was not an abuse of discretion.  Accordingly, we 
will affirm. 
 
I. 
 
Houser is a Pennsylvania state prisoner.  In 2010, he 
initiated this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the prison’s 
superintendent, Louis S. Folino, and its medical director, Dr. 
Jin, claiming that they had been deliberately indifferent to his 
medical needs.   
 
 Houser first requested appointed counsel in 2012.  The 
District Court considered the request, but concluded that it was 
too early to tell whether the claims had sufficient merit and 
complexity to justify appointing counsel.  The court therefore 
denied the request without prejudice. 
 
 Discovery proceeded, and the defendants moved for 
summary judgment in 2013.  Houser prepared and filed 
opposition papers to the motions for summary judgment, still 
pro se.  In May 2014, while the summary judgment motions 
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were pending, he again moved to appoint counsel.  The District 
Court denied the defendants’ motions for summary judgment 
in July 2014, and, on the same day, the Magistrate Judge 
granted Houser’s motion to appoint counsel without opinion. 
 
The District Court conducted a search to secure pro 
bono counsel for Houser.  Two lawyers declined to represent 
Houser before, in mid-November 2014, the law firm Reed 
Smith LLP agreed.  After it assumed Houser’s representation, 
the parties conducted additional discovery (including new 
interrogatories, expert reports, and depositions).  Reed Smith 
would go on to devote over one thousand hours to discovery 
and trial preparation and merits our appreciation for its efforts. 
 
In August 2015, however, Reed Smith moved to 
withdraw as Houser’s counsel.  The firm cited fundamental 
disagreements with Houser on strategy, a complete breakdown 
in communication, and an irremediably broken attorney–client 
relationship.  The District Court held a conference on the 
motion, which Houser attended by video.  Reed Smith lawyers 
explained that Houser refused their calls and jeopardized the 
attorney–client privilege by forwarding their letters to the 
court.  Houser responded that he had not been 
uncommunicative, but he did disagree with Reed Smith about 
how to litigate the case.  Specifically, Reed Smith had asked 
Houser to sign an agreement that set forth its trial strategy 
(such as the claims to advance, witnesses to call, and so on), 
which Houser believed would “dismantle” his case. 
 
The District Court explained to Houser that it could not 
dictate his lawyers’ trial strategy and informed him what would 
happen if they withdrew.  The court advised:  
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[Lawyers at Reed Smith] were the third attorneys 
requested to take the case.  We’re not going to 
ask anyone else to do this.  You should 
understand that if they are out of this case, and 
they may be, that you will proceed.  And quite 
frankly, you proceeded and handled the case on 
your own for four years.  You are intimately 
aware of what the case is about.  They have done 
all the hard work in terms of getting it ready, 
getting the expert, doing the depositions.  They 
have done all that for you.  So, that is what is 
going to happen here.  I’m going to make a 
decision about how you’re going to proceed, or 
you’re going to proceed on your own, if you tell 
me that’s what you want me to do.   
. . . . 
I’m asking you, what do you want to do?  Do you 
want to go to trial with these people representing 
you, these attorneys, or do you want to go to trial 
and represent yourself?   
And as I said, you know a lot about this case.  I’m 
not suggesting that you should, but this is what 
you have to think about.  
Joint Appendix (“JA”) 115–17. 
  
Houser never gave a straightforward answer as to 
whether he consented to Reed Smith’s withdrawal, but he did 
maintain that he would not agree to its trial strategy.  Based on 
this fundamental disagreement, the District Court granted Reed 
Smith’s motion to withdraw.  It explained to Houser, “As I said 
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earlier, I think you know more about this case than anyone.  
You know what is in your head about it.  You know what 
happened to you. You have progressed with it to this point.”  
JA 137–38. 
 
Houser asked the court to put him back on the 
“appointment of counsel” list and to stay the case for six 
months while he sought pro bono counsel on his own.  The 
District Court denied this request, stating: 
 
Well, you don’t get to pick the attorney, I have 
to tell you.  That’s not how it works.  This is a 
civil case.  It’s not a criminal case.  You don’t 
get to pick the attorney, unless you want to pay 
for one, and then, of course you can.   
. . . . 
Mr. Houser will be proceeding pro se.  He has 
asked me to appoint counsel, and I don’t think 
that’s going to happen, because as I said, Reed 
Smith was the third counsel under the pro bono 
program that was asked to review and accept the 
case, and that’s as far as we’re going to go.   
. . . . 
As I indicated, two attorneys reviewed this case 
and refused to take it before Reed Smith 
reviewed it and agreed to take it.  So we’re not 
going to pursue counsel through the pro bono 
program anymore, but you certainly can pursue 
it any way you’d like.  But at this point there’s 
no continuance of the trial date.   
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. . . . 
[T]his case is already five years old, and it can’t 
be much older, because it should be litigated, it 
absolutely should.  And you have a lot of 
information.  And you have pursued this case on 
your own, quite frankly, for four years, over four 
years.  You have filed the complaint, and you 
have done that.  So, these are things that you have 
to make decisions about.   
JA 139–44.  The court ordered all documents sent to Houser 
(including deposition transcripts, medical records, and expert 
reports), and pushed the trial to December 2015. 
 
In October 2015, Houser filed a written motion to 
appoint counsel or to reconsider the oral denial of his request 
for counsel at the August conference.  The District Court 
denied this motion the next day by text-only electronic order 
and without explanation. 
 
Houser’s trial took place the first week of December.  
The jury returned a verdict for the defendants, finding that 
Houser had not proved a serious medical need. 
 
Houser moved for a new trial based on the District 
Court’s denial of his motion to appoint counsel (and other 
reasons not on appeal).  The District Court denied his motion.  
It reiterated that, “as a civil litigant, Plaintiff does not have a 
right to any counsel, let alone counsel of his choice,” and that 
it had “expended considerable effort and experienced 
significant difficulty finding counsel willing to represent 
Plaintiff in the first instance.”  JA 23.  The court also observed 
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that “Reed Smith is a prestigious law firm” that “represented 
Plaintiff ably and effectively” and that “Plaintiff demonstrated 
a command of the facts and the law and competently presented 
his own case” at trial.  JA 23.  It concluded that it was “well 
within” its discretion to deny Houser new counsel.  JA 23, 30. 
 
Houser moved to reconsider.  He argued for the first 
time that he “met all prongs under Tabron v. Grace for 
appointment of counsel.”  JA 780.  Specifically, he argued that 
his claims had merit and involved “medical issues that were 
complex including requiring an expert” and the “conflicting 
testimony of multiple witness[es].”  JA 780.  Accordingly, 
Houser contended that it was an abuse of discretion not to 
appoint new counsel.  The District Court denied the motion to 
reconsider, concluding that Houser “largely restate[d] 
arguments he asserted in prior motions” and identified no 
“intervening change in law, the availability of new evidence, 
or any clear error or manifest injustice” to warrant 
reconsideration.  JA 15.  
 
Houser timely appealed.1    
 
II. 
 
The District Court had jurisdiction over Houser’s 
§ 1983 claims under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343, and we have 
                                              
1 Houser’s attorneys on appeal are appearing pro bono.  We 
express our gratitude to those attorneys for accepting this 
matter pro bono and for the quality of their representation of 
their client.  Lawyers who act pro bono fulfill the highest 
service that members of the bar can offer to indigent parties 
and to the legal profession. 
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jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We 
review the denial of a motion to appoint counsel for abuse of 
discretion.  See, e.g., Montgomery v. Pinchak, 294 F.3d 492, 
498 (3d Cir. 2002). 
 
III. 
 
Civil litigants have no constitutional or statutory right 
to appointed counsel.  Id.  Title 28, § 1915 provides, however, 
that “[t]he court may request an attorney to represent any 
person unable to afford counsel.”  28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). 
   
In Tabron v. Grace, we “provided district courts with a 
set of general standards for appointing counsel.”  6 F.3d at 155.  
We outlined a two-step process.  First, “the district court must 
consider as a threshold matter the merits of the plaintiff’s 
claim.”  Id.  Second, “[i]f the district court determines that the 
plaintiff’s claim has arguable merit in fact and law, the court 
should then consider a number of additional factors that bear 
on the need for appointed counsel.”  Id.  Those factors include: 
 
(1) the plaintiff’s ability to present his or her own 
case; 
(2) the complexity of the legal issues; 
(3) the degree to which factual investigation will 
be necessary and the ability of the plaintiff to 
pursue such investigation; 
(4) the amount a case is likely to turn on 
credibility determinations; 
10 
 
(5) whether the case will require the testimony of 
expert witnesses; [and] 
(6) whether the plaintiff can attain and afford 
counsel on his own behalf. 
Parham v. Johnson, 126 F.3d 454, 457 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing 
Tabron, 6 F.3d at 155–56, 157 n.5).   
 
 This appeal presents two questions:  (1) whether the 
Tabron factors guide district courts’ discretion regarding 
successive requests for counsel or only the initial request, and 
(2) whether the District Court abused its discretion by denying 
Houser new counsel. 
 
A. 
 
We first consider what role Tabron plays in successive 
requests for counsel.  We hold that Tabron applies to 
successive requests for counsel the same as it applies to initial 
requests for counsel — as a guidepost for the district courts in 
their exercise of broad discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1).   
 
The parties stake out the extreme positions on this 
question.  Houser argues not only that Tabron applies to 
successive requests for counsel, but also that district courts 
must appoint new counsel if initial appointed counsel 
withdraws.  The defendants, on the other hand, argue that 
Tabron does not apply at all to successive requests for counsel 
and therefore district courts can summarily deny new counsel 
once litigants squander their first chance.  Our precedents, 
however, do not support either extreme. 
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We begin with Tabron itself.  We held there that 
Congress has “give[n] district courts broad discretion to 
request an attorney to represent an indigent civil litigant.”  
6 F.3d at 153.  We thus rejected contrary precedents from our 
sister Courts of Appeals that courts should appoint counsel 
only in “exceptional circumstances,” concluding that neither 
the statute’s “clear language” nor its “legislative history” 
supported this requirement.  Id. at 153–55.  Given “this 
opportunity” to consider what showing was required, we also 
“provided district courts with a set of general standards for 
appointing counsel.”  Id. at 155.  Then we offered the two-step 
process detailed above.  The first step, a threshold review for 
arguable merit, we described as mandatory:  courts “must 
consider . . . the merits of the plaintiff’s claim.”  Id.  In other 
words, it would be an abuse of discretion to appoint counsel to 
advance claims with no arguable merit in law and fact.  Under 
the second step, the district courts “should then consider a 
number of additional factors that bear on the need for appointed 
counsel.”  Id.  (emphasis added).  We then described some 
relevant considerations “to guide district courts.”  Id. at 157.  
But that list of “general standards” was “not meant to be 
exhaustive.”  Id. at 155, 157.  We emphasized that 
“appointment of counsel remains a matter of discretion.”  Id. at 
157.  Nothing in Tabron suggests that successive requests for 
counsel should be treated differently.   
 
Our later precedents followed suit.  In Parham, we 
reiterated that “appointment of counsel is discretionary.”  126 
F.3d at 457.  Although we “delineated various factors to aid 
district courts in determining when it is proper to appoint 
counsel” in Tabron, we advised that “[t]his list of factors is not 
exhaustive, but instead should serve as a guidepost for the 
district courts.”  Id. at 457–58.  Similarly, in Montgomery we 
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explained that “Congress has granted district courts statutory 
authority to request appointed counsel,” thereby “affording 
district courts broad discretion to determine whether 
appointment of counsel in a civil case would be appropriate.”  
294 F.3d at 498 (quotation marks omitted).  We simply 
“developed a list of criteria to aid the district courts” in 
exercising this discretion.  Id.  Again, nothing in our precedents 
distinguishes first requests for counsel from later requests.  
Tabron’s guidance applies just the same. 
 
B. 
 
 We now turn to the District Court’s decision to deny 
Houser new counsel.  Two considerations drove that decision.  
First, the District Court thought that Houser could ably 
represent himself — the first Tabron factor, although it did not 
name that factor specifically.  Second, the District Court 
thought that the scarcity of pro bono resources weighed against 
appointing Houser another lawyer.  We agree on both fronts 
and conclude that denying new counsel was not an abuse of 
discretion, even without consideration of any other Tabron 
factors.2 
 
1. 
                                              
2 Defendant Folino also argues that Houser’s claims against 
him fail Tabron’s threshold review for arguable merit because 
nonmedical prison officials cannot be deliberately indifferent 
to the medical needs of prisoners being treated by prison 
medical staff (an argument the District Court rejected at 
summary judgment and again at trial).  Since we affirm on 
other grounds, we do not reach this argument. 
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The District Court concluded that Houser could ably 
represent himself at trial.  At the withdrawal hearing, it noted 
that Houser had “proceeded and handled the case on [his] own 
for four years” before it first appointed counsel.  JA 116.  It 
opined that he knew “more about this case than anyone” and 
noted that he had “progressed with it to this point.”  JA 137–
38; see also JA 144 (“And you have a lot of information.  And 
you have pursued this case on your own, quite frankly, for four 
years, over four years.”).  Indeed, Houser successfully 
persuaded the court to deny summary judgment while acting 
pro se.  The court also noted that Reed Smith had “done all the 
hard work in terms of getting [the case] ready [for trial], getting 
the expert, doing the depositions. They have done all that for 
you.”  JA 116. 
 
This analysis corresponds with the first Tabron factor:  
Houser’s ability to present his own case.  This factor is 
“[p]erhaps the most significant of Tabron’s post-threshold 
factors.”  Montgomery, 294 F.3d at 501.  We have suggested 
that, under this factor, courts “should consider ‘the plaintiff’s 
education, literacy, prior work experience, and prior litigation 
experience’” and “must consider whether the plaintiff has 
access to necessary resources.”  Parham, 126 F.3d at 459 
(quoting Tabron, 6 F.3d at 156).  And a “sophisticated 
‘jailhouse lawyer’” is less likely to warrant appointed counsel 
than a litigant bringing his “first and only claim . . . since being 
incarcerated.”  Montgomery, 294 F.3d at 502.  A litigant’s 
“ability to file and respond to motions” in particular, we have 
explained, “does indicate . . . some legal knowledge.”  Parham, 
126 F.3d at 459.  But “this fact alone does not conclusively 
establish” that a litigant is “able to present his own case.”  Id.  
We especially hesitate to rely on an indigent litigant’s ability 
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to file written submissions when “complex discovery rules” 
still create a tactical disadvantage.  Id.; see also Tabron, 6 F.3d 
at 152, 158; Montgomery, 294 F.3d at 501–02.   
We agree with the District Court that Houser’s ability to 
present his own case argues against appointing new counsel.  
Houser’s litigation experience was extensive.  In addition to 
prosecuting this case for four years before receiving counsel, 
Houser was litigating four other cases pro se at the time.  And 
when he asked for new counsel in this case, there was no 
further discovery to conduct.  The concerns arising in other 
cases — a pro se litigant’s susceptibility to discovery tactics, 
technical rulings hindering factual investigations, complex and 
incomprehensible discovery rules — were not in play here.  
That Houser needed to review Reed Smith’s extensive work 
does not undermine the conclusion that its work ultimately 
helped him.  And the District Court observed that Houser did 
competently present his case at trial.  Certainly the District 
Court could have considered more — Houser’s “education” 
and “prior work experience,” for example, which we have 
instructed should be “considered in each meritorious case.”  
Parham, 126 F.3d at 459.  But on balance, the District Court 
acted within its discretion to conclude that Houser’s litigation 
experience, combined with Reed Smith’s yearlong 
contribution, allowed him to try his case himself.  
 
2. 
 
The District Court also relied on its difficulty finding 
counsel for Houser the first time.  It explained that two 
attorneys had reviewed the case and refused to take it before 
Reed Smith agreed.  The court later added that a “prestigious 
law firm” had represented Houser “ably and effectively” and 
that the court had “expended considerable effort and 
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experienced significant difficulty finding counsel willing to 
represent Plaintiff in the first instance.”  JA 23.   
The scarcity of pro bono counsel is important, even if it 
is not among the delineated Tabron factors.  In Tabron, we 
“emphasize[d] that volunteer lawyer time is extremely 
valuable” and “[h]ence, district courts should not request 
counsel under [§ 1915(e)(1)] indiscriminately.”  6 F.3d at 157.  
We also acknowledged “the indignities that some lawyers have 
been subjected to by certain litigants” and expressed our “trust 
that district judges will be sensitive to such problems in making 
discretionary decisions in this area.”  Id. at 157 n.7.  We have 
therefore cautioned that, “[i]n addition” to weighing the 
Tabron factors, “courts should exercise care in appointing 
counsel because volunteer lawyer time is a precious 
commodity.”  Montgomery, 294 F.3d at 499.   
 
We agree that the concern for scarce pro bono resources 
cuts against appointing Houser new counsel.   After two 
lawyers reviewed and declined his case, Houser received more 
than one thousand hours of pro bono assistance from a well-
regarded law firm, as well as a publicly compensated medical 
expert.  We recognize that these efforts might have helped to 
tempt new counsel, who would have picked up a far more trial-
ready case than Reed Smith did.  Certainly the District Court 
could have asked.  But, on the whole, its conclusion was within 
its broad discretion. 
 
3. 
 
The District Court did not review any other Tabron 
factors before concluding that Houser should not receive new 
counsel because, following a year’s worth of pro bono 
assistance, he had sufficiently taxed scarce pro bono resources 
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and could reasonably try the case himself.  It did not need to.  
We have always emphasized that the Tabron factors are only a 
guidepost for district courts in their exercise of the broad 
statutory discretion granted to them by Congress.  They are not 
exhaustive, nor are they each always essential.  For example, 
the District Court was not required mechanically to consider 
whether Houser’s claims were “likely to require extensive 
discovery and compliance with complex discovery rules” or 
would “require testimony from expert witnesses” when Reed 
Smith had already completed discovery and arranged for an 
expert at the time when Houser requested new counsel.  
Tabron, 6 F.3d at 156.  District courts should consider the 
Tabron guideposts that may be relevant to any particular 
request for counsel, including successive requests, at the time 
and stage of litigation that the request is made.  And district 
courts must, of course, explain their reasoning with enough 
detail to permit appellate review for abuse of discretion.  See 
id. at 158–59.   
 
Here, based on what the District Court did consider, we 
cannot conclude that it abused its broad discretion under 28 
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) to deny Houser new counsel. 
 
IV. 
 
For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s 
order denying Houser’s motion to appoint counsel and, 
accordingly, its orders denying Houser’s motions for a new 
trial and for reconsideration. 
